

Please check the examination details below before entering your candidate information

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| Candidate surname | | Other names | |
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Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level

Tuesday 23 January 2024

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| Morning: (Time: 2 hours) | Paper reference | WHI04/1D |
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History

International Advanced

PAPER 4: International Study with Historical Interpretations

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–90

| | |
|--|-------------|
| You must have: Extracts Booklet (enclosed) | Total Marks |
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Instructions

- Use **black** ink or ball-point pen.
- **Fill in the boxes** at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- Answer Question 1 in Section A and **ONE** question in Section B.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided
– *there may be more space than you need.*

Information

- The total mark for this paper is 50.
- The marks for **each** question are shown in brackets
– *use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.*

Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.

Turn over ►

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SECTION A

Answer Question 1. Write your answer in the space provided.

Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 1** How far do you agree with the view that Truman's decision to intervene militarily in Korea in June 1950 was mainly because Truman believed that it was 'necessary to maintain US prestige in Asia and across the world' (Extract 1, line 4–5)?

Explain your answer using Extracts 1 and 2 and your knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

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(Total for Question 1 = 25 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 25 MARKS



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SECTION B**Answer ONE question in Section B.****You must start your answer to your chosen question on the next page.****EITHER**

- 2** How far do you agree that both Britain in the Malaysian 'Emergency' and France in the First Vietnam War fought mainly to protect their own economic interests?

(Total for Question 2 = 25 marks)**OR**

- 3** How far do you agree that the ceasefire in 1973 in Vietnam was achieved mainly by concession rather than by the use of force?

(Total for Question 3 = 25 marks)

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TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 25 MARKS
TOTAL FOR PAPER = 50 MARKS



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Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level**Tuesday 23 January 2024**

Morning (Time: 2 hours)

Paper
reference**WHI04/1D****History**

International Advanced

PAPER 4: International Study with Historical Interpretations
Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–90**Extracts Booklet****Do not return this Booklet with the question paper.**

Turn over ►

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Extracts for use with Section A.

Extract 1: From S H Lee, *Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949–1954*, published in 1995.

The US response to the North Korean offensive was motivated primarily by US foreign policy thinking. The attack was viewed by the Truman government as an integral part of a Soviet global strategy. Consequently, Truman believed a US military response was necessary to maintain US prestige in Asia and across the world, and to teach the communists, particularly the Soviet Union, that the Western alliance would not tolerate aggressive imperialism. 5

Militarily, Korea was of minor importance in US global strategy but, on 25 June 1950, US State Department officials argued that a refusal to challenge communist aggression in Korea would have far-reaching negative consequences. It would weaken Japanese confidence in the American ability to protect Japan. It might increase the possibilities of Communist China intervening in South-East Asia. In Europe, US allies might question the power and commitment of the United States to its Western alliance. 10

US policymakers realised that in committing themselves to fight in Korea, they would be challenging the prestige of the Soviets and Chinese communists. They believed a collective effort was required to deter communists from escalating the conflict into global war, and the United Nations offered the best forum for presenting the Soviet Union with a unified response. They believed any Soviet action against the United Nations forces would result in escalation of war, and since the Soviets did not want war, the Soviets would not intervene directly. 15 20



Extract 2: From D Clayton James with A Sharp Wells, *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950–1953*, published in 1993.

An essential factor in the decision to send American soldiers to war in Korea was the phenomenal growth in the USA of anti-communism and its impact on Truman's presidency. Senator Joseph McCarthy began an anti-communist crusade in February 1950 by claiming that over two hundred communists were employed by the US State Department. McCarthyism spread across the US and McCarthy's accusations could not be ignored by Truman's government. 25

An easy policy for McCarthy's supporters to target was the Truman administration's reaction to events in China. US anti-communists believed that Truman could have 'saved' the Chinese mainland from a Communist takeover by supporting the Chinese Nationalists against the Chinese Communists. Truman was accused by many in the US of being 'soft' on communism. 30

Indeed, by late spring of 1950, the anti-communist feelings stirred up by Senator McCarthy had become extremely powerful in US domestic politics. As a result, Truman was being pressured to demonstrate that Truman himself, not Senator McCarthy, was actually in charge of US foreign policy, and that Truman would not allow communists to seize South Korea. It is impossible to measure fully how much this anti-communist feeling impacted on Truman's decision-making in the last week of June. However, it is difficult to imagine a McCarthyite, anti-communist public tolerating anything less than a tough stand by Truman on the Korean invasion. 35 40



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